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IN SEARCH OF PARITY: CHILD CUSTODY/VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT FOR LESBIAN 
COUPLES UNDER “COMPANION” CASES DEBRA H.1 AND IN RE H.M. 2 
 
JASON C. BEEKMAN 
 
 The United States is engaged in a national debate over whether to grant same-sex couples 
the rights and privileges of marriage.  Supporters of marriage equality flood the media with 
images of jubilant same-sex couples simply wanting the chance to say their “I dos” and have the 
state formally recognize their shared love and commitment. The unfortunate reality is, however, 
that many homosexual relationships, like heterosexual relationships, dissolve. Marriage rights 
play as important a role at a relationship’s dissolution as they do at a relationship’s inception. 
This paper focuses on one such issue often left out of the public discourse over marriage 
equality: determining parentage for the purposes of child custody/visitation as well as child 
support in the context of a lesbian relationship that has broken down. 
 Part I of this paper provides a general discussion of child support and then briefly 
describes how a member of a now dissolved lesbian partnership may be compelled to provide 
financial support for a child conceived during or raised by the partnership, where the person is 
not the birth (biological) or adoptive parent of the child. Part II outlines the role marriage rights 
play in determining parentage for the purposes of securing child support. Part III discusses the 
intersection of child custody/visitation jurisprudence and child support jurisprudence and utilizes 
a critique of New York Court of Appeals “companion”3 cases Debra H. v. Janice R. and In re 
H.M. v. E.T. to highlight the importance of relying on the same parentage standard both in 
adjudication of parental rights (child custody/visitation) and parental obligations (child support). 
Part IV proposes and evaluates possible parentage standards that could be applied in both child 
                                                 
1
 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
2
 In re H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 2010). 
3
 The word companion is placed in quotes to signal that even though the United States Supreme Court handed down 
the cases together, the legal theories underlying them are quite different. This is further developed in Part III.   
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custody/visitation adjudication as well as child support adjudication. Finally, Part V briefly 
concludes.  
I.  LEGAL PARENTAGE, CHILD SUPPORT AND SAME-SEX FAMILIES  
 
 The 2000 Census reported that 34.3% of lesbian couples were raising children.4 New 
technologies have gradually increased the opportunity for lesbian couples to raise biologically 
related children in addition to adoption. Among lesbian couples, a majority utilizes some method 
of artificial insemination,5 one of the oldest and most common forms of assisted-reproduction 
technology.6 As a consequence of artificial insemination, the biological mother automatically 
gains parental status, while the non-biological parent must seek out legal parentage.7 Some states 
have hetero-normative artificial insemination statutes that bestow automatic parentage on a 
husband who consents to his wife’s in-vitro fertilization.8 Only the District of Columbia and 
New Mexico have explicitly extended these laws to lesbian couples.9 The only other way to 
receive automatic parentage rights is if the state legally recognizes the same-sex relationship and 
provides a presumption of parenthood for any child born to the couple. Again, this is limited to 
couples living in states that recognize same-sex marriage, or provide a marriage-like status.10 
Adoption is another common method used by lesbians.11 It is important to differentiate between 
joint adoption, in which both individuals establish legal adoptive parenthood over a child, and 
                                                 
4
 See Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second-Best Option: The Case for Legislative 
Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 
57, 59 (2008); see also Ellen C. Perrin, Technical Report: Co-parent or Second Parent Adoption by Same-Sex 
Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341 (2002).   
5
 See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a Brave New World, 20 J. JUV. L. 
1, 2 (1999). 
6
 See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND 
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 86 (1995); Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the 
Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 996 (1996). For a general discussion of alternative methods for 
reproduction, see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 WIS. 
J. FAM. L. 123 (2007).  
7
 See Doskow, supra note 5, at 2. 
8
 See sources and discussion infra Part IV.A.   
9
 See sources and discussion infra notes 108-09.  
10
 See sources and discussion infra Part III.   
11
 See Doskow, supra note 5, at 3-4.  
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second-parent adoption, in which one parent is already the legal, biological parent—either 
through surrogacy, artificial insemination, or from a previous relationship—and the biological 
parent’s partner must actively seek to establish a legal relationship with the child.12 Thus, there 
are many possible scenarios where at the dissolution of a lesbian relationship one partner can 
find herself without any legal tie to the child they called their own. This complicates both the 
rights of this partner to custody/visitation as well as obligations to provide child support.  
 Ensuring financial support of children is a high priority in our country’s social policy.13 
Insufficient child support is a leading cause of child poverty.14 Furthermore, children who 
receive child support perform better academically, and are more likely to finish school and attend 
college.15 Although child support laws are left to the states, the federal government has stepped 
in to require states to implement stronger child support enforcement measures.16 In 1996, 
Congress mandated that states enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act in order to 
receive federal funds in an attempt to make child support awards more uniform and to increase 
levels and efficiency in proceedings.17   
 Child support can be sought either in an action by the partner with custody of the child 
following the partnership’s dissolution, or in an action by a governmental body attempting to 
recoup prior or prevent future child support payments, where the child or the custodial parent is 
receiving public support. Courts are charged with the responsibility of interpreting and applying 
                                                 
12
 Id.  
13
 See Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 357, 363-
65 (2003) (discussing a brief history of child support enforcement).  
14
 Id. at 360 (“The possibility of a child escaping poverty often depends on whether or not the owed child support is 
being paid.”).  
15
 See Michael L. Hopkins, “What is Sauce for the Gander is Sauce for the Goose:” Enforcing Child Support on 
Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a Child Through Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 219, 
222 (2006). 
16
 See Swank, supra note 13, at 365.   
17
 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2006).  
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state family law statutes and because most are drafted as general guidelines, the role of the court 
is substantial in determining parentage and the rights and obligations attendant to that status.18  
II.  IMPACT OF LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS   
 The legal nature of the lesbian partnership directly impacts parental determination, which 
in turn impacts child custody/visitation and support. I divide this section into the following 
categories of legal recognition: (a) same-sex marriage; (b) civil unions/domestic partnerships; (c) 
no state recognized status. The latter category I further divide into methods used to formally 
crate legal parentage: (a) second-parent adoption; and (b) adoption. Finally, there is the category 
of no legal relationship between the couple and no legal relationship between the non-biological 
partner and child.  
 A.  MARRIAGE19  
 
 
 Marriage-like recognition of same-sex relationships theoretically provides automatic 
legal parentage by way of the legal connection between the parents. For example, a legally 
married lesbian couple “engaging in reproduction through artificial insemination would not need 
to take any steps at all to protect the rights of the partner who did not carry the child, as the latter 
would be considered to be in the same position as the husband of a heterosexual woman who is 
inseminated with the semen of another man [whereby the law] . . . deems the husband the legal 
parent of [the] child born as a result of the insemination, despite the absence of genetic 
                                                 
18
 See Hopkins, supra note 15, at 222-23.   
19
 Currently, same-sex couples can marry in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the 
District of Columbia.  New York and Maryland recognize marriages between same-sex couples entered into in other 
jurisdictions. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, updated 
Feb 25, 2011, http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf. California recognizes 
marriages between same-sex couples entered into prior to November 5, 2008; marriages between same-sex couples 
entered into on or after November 5, 2008 will be accorded all of the state-conferred rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, but will not be accorded the designation. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2010); Strauss v. Horton, 207 
P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (holding that marriages between same-sex couples entered into in California prior to November 
5, 2008, are valid for all purposes); National Center for Lesbian Rights and Equality, SB 54 and Same-Sex Couples 
Who Marry Outside of California, updated Oct. 20, 2009, www.nclrights.org/SB54FAQ.  
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connection.”20 Extending this to lesbian couples, a partner in a legal same-sex marriage is 
presumed to be the parent and would have standing to contest custody/visitation as well as be 
potentially liable for child support.   
 B.  CIVIL UNIONS/DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS21 
 
 In most states that provide civil unions or domestic partnerships, the rights and 
responsibilities bestowed by that status are very similar to those of marriage, particularly with 
respect to parentage determination for children born during the relationship.22 Thus, similar to 
same-sex marriage states, in most of these civil union/domestic partnership states, the non-
biological partner is presumed to be a legal parent. For example, in Baker v. State,23 the Supreme 
Court of Vermont held that “the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples 
the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.”24 Soon after, 
the Vermont legislature formally defined these protections by enacting the Civil Union Act, 
affording same-sex couples all the legal benefits of marriage without the specific status 
declaration.25 One provision of the Civil Union Act specifically relates to parentage: “The rights 
of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent 
                                                 
20
 Doskow, supra note 5, at 3-4.  
21
 Hawaii, Illinois, and New Jersey permit same-sex couples to enter into civil unions, a status that provides all of 
the state conferred rights and responsibilities of marriage. California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Washington 
D.C. permit same-sex couples to enter into registered domestic partnerships, which provide all or almost all of the 
state-conferred rights and responsibilities of marriage. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality & Other 
Relationship Recognition Laws, updated Feb 25, 2011, 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf. Among other protections, all of these 
statuses confer upon the couple the same rights and responsibilities with regard to a child born to the couple as are 
conferred on heterosexual married couples.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2010) (“The rights and 
obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of 
spouses.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31(e) (West 2010) (“The rights of civil union couples with respect to a child of 
whom either becomes the parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple 
with respect to a child of whom either spouse or partner in a civil union couple becomes the parent during the 
marriage.”).  
22
 See sources cited supra note 21.  
23
 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
24
 Id. at 867. 
25
 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (LexisNexis 2002). 
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during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to 
a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.”26 Therefore, a 
Vermont civil union provides a rebuttable marriage-like presumption that the non-biological, 
non-adoptive parent is a legal parent.27 
 C.  NO LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP  
 
 Finally, the following thirty-two states provide no legal recognition for same-sex couples: 
Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.28 It is important 
to note that a separate issue apart from a state’s own laws regarding same-sex marriage concerns 
recognition of other states’ same-sex marriage laws. Currently, only New York and Maryland 
fully acknowledge out-of-state same-sex marriages.29 
 In the absence of a legal parent-child relationship automatically formed via the legal 
relationship between the same-sex partnership, legal parental status can be sought through 
adoption. It is important to distinguish between joint and second-parent adoption. The term joint 
adoption generally refers to a couple together adopting a child who is not the biological or pre-
existing adoptive child of either of them.  
  I. JOINT ADOPTION 
 
 Formal adoption provides standing to contest child custody/visitation as well as provides 
a prima facie case of liability against a former domestic partner to pay child support. However, 
                                                 
26
 Id. tit. 15, § 1204(f).  
27
 See id.  
28
 See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, updated Feb 25, 2011, 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf. 
29
 Id.  
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not all states allow homosexuals to adopt. Until very recently Florida law expressly prohibited 
“homosexual” individuals from adopting.30 Similarly, as of 2000, Mississippi law expressly 
prohibits “adoption by couples of the same gender.”31 Utah prohibits adoption “by a person who 
is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage.”
32
 Utah defines 
cohabitation as “residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with 
that person.”
33
 Even when available, joint-adoption is not ideal in the majority of lesbian families 
where one of the partners is already the biological parent because it requires severing the pre-
existing relationship between the biological parent and child in order to allow both individuals to 
jointly adopt the child. 34 
  II.  SECOND PARENT ADOPTION  
 
 Some states explicitly permit legal adoption by a second parent in a same-sex relationship 
without terminating the legal status of the biological parent.
35
 In these states, “the adoptive 
                                                 
30
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that 
person is a homosexual.”). 
31
 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2007) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). 
32
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2008).  33
 Id.  
34
 Most states passed adoption statutes with cut-off provisions in order to effectuate a “fresh start” policy that 
protects the new adoptive parents from claims of the child’s biological parents. See In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 
P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash. 1972) (stating that the purpose of these types of severing provisions gives the adopted 
child a “‘fresh start’ by treating him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and severing all ties with the past.”). 
For an example of a cut-off provision, see UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §1-105, 9 U.L.A. 23 (1994). In order to avoid the 
cut-off provision terminating the biological parent’s rights (for the majority of states that include such a provision), 
the biological parent may willingly terminate his or her parental rights to the child in order to become a joint 
adoptive parent alongside her partner.  If the court approves the joint adoption, then both parents will be legal 
parents for all purposes.  
35See Family Equality Council, State-by-State: Second Parent Adoption Laws, May 2008, 
http://www.familyequality.org/pdf/secondparent_withcitations.pdf. Second-parent adoption is available by statute in 
California, Connecticut, and Vermont.  See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000(g) (West 2010) (allowing only registered 
domestic partners to adopt without terminating the legal status of the biological parent); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
45a-724(a)(3) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002).  Appellate court decisions in the following 
jurisdictions have also approved second-parent adoption: California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.  See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 
562–63 (Cal. 2003); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 898 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of Infant K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Adoption of 
M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993); 
In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 540–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 
660 N.E.2d 397, 405–06 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002); Adoption of 
B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).  
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parent stands in parity with the biological parent and has all the rights and responsibilities that 
flow from legal parenthood.”36 Second-parent adoption is modeled on stepparent adoption, a 
statutory scheme that allows a biological (or adoptive) parent’s spouse to adopt a child without 
terminating that parent’s legal rights.37 Although most states are not explicit in terms of whether 
second-parent adoption is available for same-sex families, some states do explicitly provide for 
same-sex second-parent adoption by statute, while others provide for same-sex second-parent 
adoption through appellate court decisions.38 Vermont is a unique example because it provides 
protection for same-sex families through a family law code that is gender neutral rather than 
specifically applying only to homosexual couples, stating “[i]f a family unit consists of a parent 
and the parent’s partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent 
may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent’s parental rights is unnecessary in an 
adoption under this subsection.”
39
 
 In a family structure in which only one parent is the biological parent, second-parent 
adoption is often thought of as the best solution to legalize the relationship between the non-
biological parent and the child.
40
 However, second-parent adoptions are far from a panacea.41 
                                                 
36
 Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 
VILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (2004). 
37
 See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of 
Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 205 (2009) [hereinafter Parentage Laws].  
38
 See sources cited supra note 35. 
39VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002). 
40There are other non-litigious options for co-parents, including co-parenting agreements, pre-birth decrees, and 
visitation agreements subsequent to the dissolution of the relationship.  See Osborne, supra note 36, at 367–68.  Co-
parenting agreements are simple, contract-like legal documents outlining the particular rights and responsibilities of 
each parent.  Id. at 370–71.  Yet, courts often refuse to enforce co-parenting agreements on the grounds that 
biological parents cannot contract away any portion of their constitutional right to guide the upbringing of their 
children.  Id.  Pre-birth decrees attempt to adjudicate parenthood from conception (be it by in vitro sperm donation, 
surrogacy, or other method).  Id. at 371–72.  This option is only available to those parents seeking to legally solidify 
their relationship with an as yet unborn child.  Id.  Visitation agreements, even if prepared preemptively before the 
dissolution of a relationship, are often unenforceable because courts are reluctant to allow parties to independently 
contract for child custody without a court applying a best interest of the child standard.  Id. at 372–74.  Despite these 
other attempts to avoid a post-dissolution adversarial court determination of parental rights, second-parent adoption 
is the most robust non-litigious option to formally establish a legal parent–child relationship.  Id. at 367–68.  
41
 See sources and discussion infra notes 65-66.   
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Part III below discusses some of the problems in placing too much of an emphasis on second-
parent adoption as the New York Court of Appeals did in Debra H.  
III.  THE INTERSECTION OF CHILD CUSTODY/VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT AND THE 
CONCERNING PRECEDENT OF “COMPANION” CASES DEBRA H. AND IN RE H.M.  
 
 The New York Court of Appeals handed down Debra H. and In re H.M. the same day—
May 4, 2010. Both involved lesbian families. Both were child-related cases; Debra H. addressing 
a petitioner seeking visitation and In re H.M. addressing a petitioner seeking child support.  Both 
were to be treated under a similar “best interest of the child” standard. Yet, these cases are 
anything but “companion” cases.  Taken together, these cases establish a legal regime for lesbian 
partners where for the purposes of contesting child custody the court takes a narrow view of legal 
parenthood, requiring that the non-biological partner formally adopt the child through second-
parent adoption, but for securing child support against a non-biological parent, the court takes a 
much more expansive view of legal parenthood.  
 Debra H. held that absent a second-parent adoption, a non-biological parent does not 
have standing to seek custody or visitation with the child she helped raise.42 The compelling facts 
of Debra H. are common to these types of cases. Respondent Janice R. conceived through 
artificial insemination and gave birth to M.R. after Janice R. and Debra H. entered into a civil 
union in the State of Vermont.43 While Debra H. did not take the step of formally adopting M.R. 
as a second parent, for much of his life, Janice R. held Debra H. out—both to the world and to 
M.R.—as M.R.’s mother and the two women raised M.R. together until they separated in 2006.44  
                                                 
42
 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 191 (N.Y. 2010). However, the court did end up upholding the 
parental rights of the non-biological mother based on the fact that the couple entered into a Vermont civil union and 
comity principles required that the court follow Vermont law.  Id. at 196-97. Therefore, the New York Court of 
Appeals ultimately held that Debra H. is the legal parent of M.R. and thus entitled to seek custody and visitation 
with her son. The precedential value of this decision in terms of bestowing parenthood based on an out-of-state civil 
union remains to be seen.  
43
 See id. at 186.  
44
 Id. at 186-88.   
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Indeed, even after they separated, Debra H. continued to act as M.R.’s parent.45 It was not until 
May 2008, when M.R. was almost five years old, that Janice R. abruptly and unilaterally sought 
to sever all forms of contact between Debra H. and M.R.46  
 The New York Court of Appeals was quite divided in its analysis in Debra H., evident by 
four separate concurrences. However, the majority clearly expressed the court’s reaffirmation of 
the court’s precedent established in In re Alison D. v. Virginia M47 nearly twenty-years prior. In 
Alison D., the Court of Appeals of New York addressed whether a non-biological, non-adoptive 
“stranger” had standing to seek visitation under applicable New York domestic relations law.48 
The facts of Alison D., similar to the facts of Debra H., are quite compelling. Together Alison D. 
and respondent Virginia M. planned for the conception and birth of the child and agreed to share 
jointly in all the privileges and obligations of parenthood.49 The child was given Alison’s last 
name as his middle name and Alison shared in both pre-birth and post-birth expenses.50 In fact, 
until the child was two years and four months, both individuals jointly cared for and made 
decisions regarding the child.51 Yet, the court followed a bright-line rule, holding that without a 
formal second-parent adoption, “although [Alison] apparently nurtured a close and loving 
relationship with the child, she is not a parent.”52  
 Lower New York courts have long criticized Alison D.53  In 2008, a New York trial court 
stated: “In the seventeen years since Alison D., under constraint of that decision, courts have 
continued to deny the proactive efforts of a non-biological, non-adoptive domestic partner or 
                                                 
45
 Id.  
46
 Id.  
47
 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).  
48
 See id. at 27.  
49
 Id.  
50
 Id.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id at 28.  
53
 See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) 
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spouse to obtain custodial rights, notwithstanding the ties that may have developed between that 
person and the child.”54 The court argued that “if the concern of both the legislature and the 
Court of Appeals is what is in the child’s best interest, a formulaic approach to finding that a 
‘parent’ can only mean a biologic or adoptive parent may not always be appropriate.”55 
 Despite Debra H. presenting the perfect opportunity for the Court of Appeals to revise its 
ruling in Alison D., the court instead authoritatively rejected arguments that Alison D. should be 
overruled because it is outmoded, unworkable and does not take into account the best interests of 
the child.56 The court remained stubbornly steadfast, holding that “Alison D., in conjunction with 
second-parent adoption, creates a bright line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic 
breakups.”57 Preferring an arguably naive sense of certainty and predictability over the best 
interest of the child in maintaining a meaningful relationship, the court refused to utilize its 
common law and equitable powers to expand its definition of a parent to include “de facto” 
parenthood or parent “by estoppel.”58  Granted, a more equitable or functional analysis is more 
subjective than biology; however, as Judge Smith, concurring in Debra H and In re H.M.,. 
correctly understands, “it is not possible for both members of a same-sex couple to become 
biological parents of the same child . . . [t]hese differences seem . . . to warrant different 
treatment.”59 Different treatment does not mean worse treatment; requiring a lesbian couple to 
seek a formal second-parent adoption is much more of a burden than the burden on heterosexual 
couples to take a DNA test.   
                                                 
54
 Id. at 507.   
55
 Id.  
56See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 191-93.  
57
 Id. at 191.  
58
 Id. at 192-93.  
59
 Id. at 250 (Smith, J., concurring).  
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 In the end, however, the court found Debra H. had standing to seek custody, recognizing 
her parenthood by way of the Vermont civil union she entered into with Janice R.60 The court 
found the civil union “as determinable as whether there had been a second-parent adoption,” 
because “both civil union and adoption require the biological or adoptive parent’s legal consent, 
as opposed to the indeterminate implied consent featured in the various [equitable] tests 
proposed to establish de facto or functional parentage.”61 However, does Janice R. holding Debra 
H. out to the world as M.R.’s mother, and the two women together raising M.R. for over two 
years, not convey a determinable level of consent?62 In Part IV below I further combat the 
court’s assertion that it was forced to maintain the Alison D. parental requirements of biology or 
adoption for the proffered reasons of certainty and predictability. 
 While the court finds fault in other potential theories of parenthood, it does not 
adequately acknowledge the faults in requiring a second-parent adoption. Instead, the court 
merely pointed to its thought process behind opening the door for same-sex second-parent 
adoption in In re Jacob.63 The court “stressed that permitting such second-parent adoptions 
‘allows . . . children to achieve a measure of permanency with both parent figures and avoids the 
sort of disruptive visitation battle [the court] faced in [Alison D.].”64 However, there is a 
difference between allowing second-parent adoption and requiring it. Heterosexual parents 
simply need to take a DNA test to be considered a parent with standing to contest 
custody/visitation. Yet, the court is comfortable requiring homosexual parents to go through a 
                                                 
60
 See id. at 196-97.  
61
 Id.  Judge Graffeo made a similar argument in his concurrence.  See id. at 197 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“Rather 
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 See id. at 186-88.   
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 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).  
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 Debra H. v. Jannice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 190 (N.Y. 2010) (internal citations removed).  
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second-parent adoption, a process that is at best, a time-consuming, expensive and intrusive.65 
The couple must hire a lawyer and participate in what will likely be a long, drawn-out process. 
Many families remain unfamiliar with these procedures, or even if familiar when them, are 
unable to amass the resources necessary to fully pursue them. It can also be emotionally taxing; 
until a judge signs the adoption decree, the non-biological mother and her child are legal 
strangers.66 
 Same-sex couples likely do not even consciously consider the importance of a second-
parent adoption. Similar to many newlyweds who find it unnecessary to sign pre-nuptial 
agreements because they could never see the relationship dissolving, same-sex couples might not 
subject themselves to the expensive, drawn out process of second-parent adoption because they 
similarly are too blinded by love to ever consider the legal ramifications should the couple break 
up.67 Thus, requiring a second-parent adoption closes the door to maintaining relationships with 
both parents in households headed by a same-sex couple for whom adoption may not be a 
practical option for any number of reasons.   
 Judge Kaye, dissenting in Alison D., warned that the best interest of the child is ignored 
when requiring second-parent adoption “limit[s] their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be 
crucial to their development.”68 Thus, Judge Kaye would have remanded Alison D. for the lower 
court to assess Alison’s parenthood based on a theory of in loco parentis to see if it was in the 
                                                 
65
 See Parentage Laws, supra note 37, at 267 (“Even where available, however, recognition of a child's family 
should not depend upon the family's access to court proceedings that require a lawyer and take two precious and 
limited commodities-time and money."); see also In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036 (N.J. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2005) (noting that the couple decided not to seek a second-parent adoption because they did not want the child in 
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66See Parentage Laws, supra note 37, at 208.  
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 See A.H. v. M. P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 n.6  (Mass. 2006) ("The plaintiff states that she had no sense of urgency 
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68
 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d, 651, 658 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J. dissenting).  This same idea is echoed in 
Judge Ciparick’s concurrence in Debra H. 930 N.E.2d at 201 (Ciparick, J., concurring).  
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best interest of the child to allow visitation.69 This is similar to what the Court of Appeals should 
have done in Debra H.; and, in fact, it is what the trial court did by applying principles of equity 
to find Debra H. a de facto parent.70  
 Such an equity-based approach to parentage would parallel the Court of Appeals 
approach to parentage determination in In re H.M., thereby placing parentage standards for child 
custody/visitation standing in parity with parentage for adjudicating child support. In Shondel J., 
the New York Court of Appeals held that despite a lack of genetic connection, the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel prohibited a man who had held himself out to be the father of a child from 
denying paternity for purposes of paying child support.71  
 The divergence between New York’s parentage determination in lesbian family child 
custody/visitation and child support cases grew in In re H.M.72 where the court applied a similar 
equitable parentage determination as in Shondel J. H.M. and her partner H.M. planned to 
conceive and raise a child together, discussing, among other things, available methods of 
conception, child-rearing practices, and whether the child would be raised as a sibling of E.T.’s 
children from a prior relationship.73 After several failed attempts, H.M. finally became pregnant 
by artificial insemination through a procedure E.T. performed and helped finance.74 E.T. was 
present in the delivery room at birth, and participated in the child’s care until the couple ended 
                                                 
69
 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 33.  
70
 See H v. R, No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2., 2008) (“The facts as alleged by petitioner, 
if found to be true, establish a prima facie basis for invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel . . . of particular 
significance are her allegations that the parties moved in together and consulted an adoption attorney prior to M.R's 
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on some of M.R.'s school and camp documents, and that petitioner was present in the delivery room at M.R.'s birth 
and cut his umbilical cord, and that M.R. was given petitioner's last name as a middle name on his original birth 
certificate.”).  
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 Id.  
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 See In re H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y. 2010). 
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 See id. at 207. 
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 See id.  
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their relationship four months later.75 
  Following more of an Alison D.-type parentage determination, the New York Appellate 
Division denied jurisdiction to entertain H.M.’s petition for child support, highlighting the fact 
that “H.M. [was] never married to or in a civil union with E.T., [and yet] seeks to have E.T., a 
woman having no biological or legal connection to the subject child, adjudicated a parent of that 
child and required to pay child support.”76 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the lower family court could hear a claim from H.M. that E.T., the non-biological and non-
adoptive partner, is liable for child support.77 Far from the court’s analysis in Debra H., the 
Court of Appeals in H.M. focused heavily on equitable considerations. The court did not even 
acknowledge that the defendant was not a “legal” parent under Alison D. All the reasons the 
court articulated for maintaining Alison D. in the child custody/visitation context completely 
disappeared in the child support context.   
 Judge Smith, concurring in both Debra H. and Matter of H.M., acknowledged that “[both 
cases] present (though neither majority decision ultimately turns on) the question of whether a 
person other than a biological or adoptive mother or father may be a “parent” under New York 
law.”78 Although agreeing with the ultimate outcome in both—recognizing Debra H.’s parental 
status under the law of Vermont and providing jurisdiction in family court to adjudicate child 
support—Judge Smith was rightfully concerned about the divergent nature of the underlying 
basis for adjudication parentage in each.  For that reason, Judge Smith advocated departing from 
Alison D., both for visitation and child support.79 According to Judge Smith, “there is much to be 
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 See id.  
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 H.M. v. E.T., 881 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  
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 See H.M., 930 N.E.2d at 209. 
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 Id. (Smith, J., concurring).   
79See id.  
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said for reaffirming Alison D. . . . [but] there is even more to be said against it.”80 Although 
acknowledging the need for predictability and certainty in cases of parental rights and 
obligations, Judge Smith felt that this should not overshadow the desire to act in the best interest 
of the child to maintain important child-parent relationships.81 Judge Ciparick also expressed 
concern that “the [Debra H.] majority sees no inconsistency in applying equitable estoppel . . . 
for purposes of support, but not to create standing when visitation and child custody are 
sought.”82  Judge Ciparick eloquently described how “the duty to support and the rights of 
parentage go hand in hand and it is nonsensical to treat the two things as severable.”83 Finally, 
Judge Jones, dissenting in In re H.M. stated most authoritatively that “the position taken by the 
majority [in In re H.M.] is inconsistent with [the] Court's holding today in Debra H.”84 
 In their concurrences, Judge Smith and Judge Ciparick both propose alternative parentage 
standards, based more on the court’s common law and equitable powers, to replace Alison D. 
Both of these are further discussed in the possible solutions discussion in Part IV. Judge Smith 
proposed a version of a solution discussed in Part IV.A.i.: “where a child is conceived through 
[artificial insemination] by one member of a same-sex couple living together, with the 
knowledge and consent of the other, the child is a matter of law—at least in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances—the child of both.”85 Judge Ciparick proposed a version of a 
solution I discuss in Part IV.A.ii.  In addition to biological and adopting parents, Judge Ciparick 
would also bestow parentage on an individual who can show that: (1) the biological or adoptive 
parent consented to and encouraged the formation of a parental relationship; and (2) the 
petitioner intended to and actually did assume the typical obligations and roles associated with 
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 Id.  
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 See id.   
82
 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 201-02 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., concurring).  
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 214 (Jones, J., dissenting).  
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 H.M., 930 N.E.2d at 211 (Smith, J., concurring).  
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parenting the child.86 Both of these, Judge Smith focusing more on consent to insemination, and 
Judge Ciparick focusing more on intent and de facto/functional parenthood, are viable options 
and preferable to Alison D.  
IV. POSSIBLE PARENTAGE THEORIES FOR CHILD CUSTODY/VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT 
 Below I briefly describe possible parentage theories in the context of lesbian families that 
should be applied to determine parentage both in actions for child custody/visitation as well as 
actions for child-support.    I evaluate each theory and stress the importance of focusing on the 
relationship between child and partner and less on the relationship between the partners.  
 A.  READ APPLICABLE PARENTAGE STATUTES IN A GENDER-NEUTRAL WAY 
  
  i.  ASSISTED REPRODUCTION  STATUTES  
  
 Many states have enacted laws, or developed doctrines through the court’s common law 
and equitable powers, to grant automatic legal parentage to a woman’s husband who consents to 
her artificial insemination.87 Read in a gender-neutral way, these should apply to same-sex 
couples if they are in a legally recognized same-sex marriage or marriage-like arrangement.88  
Several state courts have gone a step further and formally and explicitly extended these statutes 
and doctrines to lesbian couples.89  For example, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the legal 
parentage of a child born through assisted reproduction to a same-sex couple in a civil union and 
held that both spouses were the legal parents of the resulting child.90 The court stated that “[i]f 
Janet had been Lisa’s husband, these factors would make Janet the parent of the child born from 
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 See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 202-03 (Ciparick, J., concurring).  
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 See Hopkins, supra note 5, at 221-22.  
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 See sources and discussion supra Part II.  
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 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2011)(“The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners 
with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.”); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 
660, 666 (Cal. 2005) (noting in dicta that children born to registered domestic partners are considered the legal 
children of both partners); Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that there appears to be no 
reason for permitting heterosexual couples to bypass adoption proceedings by conceiving a child through mutually 
consensual artificial insemination, but not permitting same-sex couples to do the same).   
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 Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 918 (2007).   
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the artificial insemination” and because Vermont law requires “the equality of treatment of 
partners in civil unions,” the same result must be true as to a same-sex civil union spouse.91  
 However, there are still the majority of states that do not legally recognize same-sex 
relationships. Thus, the focus on the legal status of the same-sex couple makes the widespread 
implementation of this solution somewhat problematic. However, the problem with these statutes 
and doctrines requiring marriage goes beyond applicability; courts should be looking more at the 
relationship between the child and partner and less at the relationship between the partners. 92   
Marriage should never play an important role; courts certainly do not hesitate to enforce child 
support obligations on biological un-wed parents of children who are conceived by accident.93  
Thus, including marital status in a doctrine or statute that might lead to child support payments, 
for example, is arguably unconstitutional since it discriminates against children of non-married 
couples.  Such discrimination against “illegitimate” children of non-married couples—the status 
of most in same-sex families since the majority of states do not recognize same-sex 
relationships94—has long been ruled unconstitutional.  A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
between 1968 and 1983 and the enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) eliminated legal 
discrimination based on the “legitimacy” of a child.95 The UPA includes Section 202, which 
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(1968) (holding that non-marital children were clearly persons within the meaning of the Equal protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution, and it would be “invidious to discriminate against them.”); see also UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT, § 202 (2001) (2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2010); Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions 
Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L. J. 141, 154 (2004).   
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states that a child born to parents who are not married to each other has the same rights under the 
law as a child born to parents who are married to each other.96 Furthermore, with regard to child 
support, the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution requires states to enforce child support 
regardless of whether the parents of the child were ever married.97  
 Rather than focus on the same-sex couple’s legal status, these statutes and doctrines 
should focus more on parental behavior.  Judge Smith recognized this fact in his proposed 
solution in Debra H., focusing on consent to insemination and intent to parent rather than 
focusing on the legal status of the parents’ relationship.98 When a child is conceived through the 
process of artificial insemination into a union of two women, “the decision to create the child is 
even more conscious and deliberate than the decision that is made by some couples who are both 
biological parents and conceive a child by direct sexual intercourse.”99  It demonstrates a well-
thought-out decision and steadfast commitment to care and support the child. Thus, under an 
ideal artificial insemination statute, the consenting non-biological parent, with an intent to parent 
the child, would be presumed to be a legal mother of the child, irrespective of the legal status of 
the couples relationship, and can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.100  In the 
absence of any such evidence, the partner would be able both to seek custody/visitation as well 
as be chargeable with the duty of child support.   
 Legislation in the District of Columbia and New Mexico provide a good model for an 
ideal assisted reproduction statute.  The D.C. legislation reads: “A person who consents to the 
artificial insemination . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is conclusively established 
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 See Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.  
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 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 211 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring).  
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 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (Greaney, J., dissenting).  
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 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 667 (Cal. 2005).    
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as a parent of the resulting child.”101 Similarly, the New Mexico statute reads: “A person who . . . 
consents to assisted reproduction . . . with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the 
resulting child.”102 Both correctly focus on the deliberate and intentional participation in the 
decision to bring a child into the world rather than on the legal status of the same-sex couple.  In 
2008, The American Bar Association lent its approval to this formulation by approving a Model 
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology: “An individual who . . . consents to assisted 
reproduction by a woman . . .  with the intent to be a parent of her child is a parent of the 
resulting child.”103  
  II.  HOLDING OUT PROVISIONS IN STATE FAMILY LAW STATUTES  
 
 Most state parentage laws are based on the UPA. 104  The UPA includes a “holding out” 
presumption, which many states have thereby incorporated into their own parentage laws.105  The 
“holding out” presumption is a provision that establishes a presumption of parentage for a man 
if, “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly 
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 D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(2001).  See also D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(A) and (B)  (2001) (“(A)Consent by a 
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 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West 2010).  
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Utah, Washington, Wyoming.  See http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last 
visited May 10, 2011). Although other states have not formally adopted the UPA, it still influences the creation of 
state parentage laws. 
105
 See id. 
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holds out the child as his natural child.”106 Thus far, California is the only state that has 
addressed whether such a holding out can be read in a gender neutral way and thereby apply to a 
woman in a same-sex relationship.107  In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 108 the California Supreme 
Court determined that the non-biological parent, Elisa, was a legal parent under California’s 
holding out presumption because she received the children into her home and openly held them 
out as her natural children.109 The court concluded that the parentage presumption was not 
rebutted simply by the fact that she was not the biological parent.110 The judges focused on the 
best interest of the child in establishing a child-parent relationship, regardless of the marital 
status of the parents. Specifically, the court spoke of the fact that Elisa “actively participated in 
causing the children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the children as 
her own together with the birth mother” and also that after birth, she “voluntarily accepted the 
rights and obligations of parenthood.”111 Both parties breast-fed the children,  chose the 
children’s names, giving them all hyphenated combination of their surnames, and co-parented 
the children until they were approximately two years old.112 Justice Kennard in his concurring 
opinion put it well: “Had a man who, like Elisa, lacked any biological connection to the twins 
received them into his home and held them out as his natural children, this case would . . . 
undoubtedly have resulted in determination that he met the statutory criteria for being the 
presumed father of the twins.”113 
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 In terms of the sufficient amount of time a parent must “hold out” a child as her own 
before considered a “legal parent” under the “holding out” presumption, in Charisma R. v. 
Kristina S., the California Court of Appeal held that Charisma was entitled to a presumption of 
parentage even though she co-parented the child for only thirteen weeks.114 With regard to the 
short duration, the court emphasized that “[o]n its face, the [California] statute contains no 
durational requirement; it does not, for example, state that the child must be received or held out 
‘for a significant period of time.’”115 
 This is a solution with much potential, especially since the presence of the 1973 UPA 
“holding out” presumption, or something similar, is quite widespread across the 50 states. 116 In 
addition, nine states have adopted the 2002 version of the UPA which also includes a holding out 
provision, however unlike the open-ended 1973 version, the 2002 version has a specific 
durational requirement, providing that the person must have lived with and held the child out as 
her own for the first two years of the child’s life.117  
 Arguably the only concern with this solution is one shared among many of the equity-
based solutions.  While the “holding out” presumption appropriately looks at the relationship 
between the child and parent rather than between the parents, it focuses too much on post-birth 
behavior.  Therefore, it may be difficult for the non-birth parent to seek custody/visitation, and 
likewise for the biological parent to seek support, if the couple ended their relationship prior to 
the birth of the child. For example, in two cases in which the lesbian couple terminated their 
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own.”); see also sources cited supra note 105. 
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relationship prior to the birth of children conceived through alternative insemination, appellate 
courts in both Massachusetts and Washington concluded that the non-birth partner was not a 
legal parent and did not have any legal obligation to support the resulting child.118  Perhaps then, 
this solution would be stronger if more weight was placed on the intent to have a child in the first 
place by, for example, looking at consent to the partner’s artificial insemination, attendance at 
birthing classes, and other pre-birth behavior.  In assessing child support for heterosexual 
couples, a man cannot escape his obligation merely by running out on the family.  It should not 
be any different for homosexual couples.  
B.  UTILIZE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES SUCH AS IN LOCO PARENTIS, DE FACTO 
PARENTHOOD, AND ESTOPPEL. 
  
 In the absence of the above possible solutions, common law and equitable considerations 
should be applied to determine parentage for both child custody/visitation and child support for a 
parent with no biological, adoptive, or other legal connection to the child.  Courts have long 
recognized their authority “in the absence of legislative mandates . . . [to] construct a fair, 
workable and responsible basis for protection of children, aside from whatever rights the adults 
may have vis a vis each other.”119 Therefore, courts in a growing number of states have applied 
long standing common law or equitable doctrines, including in loco parentis, de facto 
parenthood, psychological parent, or parent by estoppel to conclude that a person who is not 
biological or adoptive relationship with a child, but who has functioned as a parent, is entitled to 
some rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.120 While preferable to the parentage 
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standard set in Debra H., it is important to note that adjudicating parenthood under statutory 
“holding out” provisions in the state’s family law or under a gender-neutral reading of an 
artificial insemination statute is preferable to the application of common law and equitable 
doctrines because persons found to be protected under equitable and common law doctrines 
might not be granted full legal parental status. 
  i. PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT 
  
 The Colorado Court of Appeals held that a “psychological parent” is a person with whom 
the child has “deep emotional bonds such that the child recognizes the person, independent of the 
legal form of the relationship, as a parent from whom they receive daily guidance and 
nurturance.”121 Alaska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and West Virginia, among others, also have 
utilized a “psychological parent” standard when adjudicating parentage.122  
  II.  IN LOCO PARENTIS  
 
 While utilizing a different term, in loco parentis, states including Arkansas, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania follow a similar standard as “psychological parent” by 
looking at the relationship between a child and a person who has acted as a parent but who has 
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P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that a lesbian co-parent had standing to seek custody where the legal 
parent consented to and fostered the formation of a bonded parent-child relationship between the child and the 
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no biological, adoptive or other legal tie.123 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first established 
the doctrine of in loco parentis, recognizing parenthood for an individual who acts like a parent 
and voluntarily takes on parental obligations as if she were a natural parent. 124 Spells v. Spells 
first formulated the in loco parentis doctrine:  
[A] person may put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the 
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a 
legal adoption.  [The status of in loco parentis] embodies two ideas first, the assumption 
of a parental status, and second, the discharge of parental duties.125 
 
  III.  DE FACTO PARENTHOOD  
 
 Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, among 
others, use the term de facto parent or custodian to describe a person who has functioned as a 
child's parent and established a parent-child bond.126 In a decision often cited by other courts, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H-K.127 established a four-part test for 
demonstrating a de facto parent relationship: (1) whether the legal parent consented to or fostered 
the relationship between the de facto parent and the child; (2) whether the de facto parent lived 
with the child; (3) whether the de facto parent assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including contributing 
towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) whether a 
parent-child bond was formed.128 Courts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and 
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Washington, among others, have directly adopted this test.129 Courts in other states have adopted 
similar versions of this test.130  However, similar to the problems with the “holding out” solution, 
this theory of parentage focuses heavily on post-birth behavior and might prove problematic if 
the relationship dissolved before the child’s birth.   
  IV.  EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL  
 
 Courts have also followed principles of equitable estoppel in determinating parentage by 
looking at behavior pre-conception and post-birth to see whether a reasonable expectation 
formed that the non-biological, non-adoptive parent would support the child.  While courts have 
so far used this theory to enforce child support based on a theory of reliance, there is no reason 
this should not also be used as a parentage standard in child custody/visitation cases.131 In the 
first appellate court decision in the nation to apply the estoppel doctrine in the child support 
context, L.S.K. v. H.A.N.,132 the Pennsylvania Superior Court found sufficient facts to infer that 
the partner’s actions, both pre-conception and post birth, and both financially and emotionally, 
caused the mother to form the reasonable expectation that the partner would support the child.133  
The court explained that equitable estoppel is a doctrine of fundamental fairness designed to 
preclude a party from depriving another of a reasonable expectation when the party inducing the 
expectation knew or should have known that the other party would rely upon that conduct to his 
or her detriment.134 Thus, the court used the estoppel doctrine to preclude a former domestic 
partner from defending against paying child support by arguing that a lack of biological 
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connection prevented a child support obligation.135  The Superior Court focused on how H.A.N. 
“acted as a ‘co-parent’ . . . in all areas concerning the children’s conception, care and support.”136 
Besides agreeing to have children through artificial insemination, H.A.N. was an active 
participant in childbirth classes and in the delivery room itself, as well as assisted in selecting the 
names of the children.137 After birth she stayed home with the children while L.S.K. continued 
her career; therefore, H.A.N. was intimately involved in the children’s day-to-day care and 
schooling as well as health needs for over eight years.138  
  V.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI) PRINCIPLES  
       OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
 
 Despite differences in terminology, the equitable doctrines discussed above generally 
have similar focuses and describe a person who does not have a biological, adoptive, or other 
legally recognized relationship with the child, but who should be entitled to seek parental rights 
and protections by virtue of having established an actual parent-child relationship.139 While state 
courts generally use the terms “psychological parent,” in loco parentis, de facto parent, and 
“parent by estoppel” interchangeably, the drafters of the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution 
(ALI Principles)140 distinguished these terms from one another. The ALI Principles narrows the 
definition of de facto parent and gives the terms “parent by estoppel” and “de facto” parent 
significantly different meanings.  The ALI Principles also explicitly gives de facto parentage a 
lesser status than parentage by estoppel.  
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 The ALI Principles might prove confusing since it adopts the same terms utilized by state 
courts, but with different meanings.   Most courts that use the term “de facto parent” give it a 
broader meaning similar to what the ALI Principles refer to as a “parent by estoppel.” For 
illustration, the Washington Supreme Court’s four factor test to establish de facto parenthood is 
nearly identical to the criteria for parentage by estoppel under the ALI Principles.141 The ALI 
Principles define a parent by estoppel, in relevant part, as: 
An individual who, though not a legal parent, … lived with the child since the child's 
birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of 
a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and 
responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in 
the child's best interests; or … lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and 
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with 
the child's parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds 
that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's best interests.142 
 
 Thus, under the ALI Principles, a person can become a parent by estoppel only where the 
child's legal parent has agreed to share full parental rights and responsibilities and only when the 
court finds that recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests. Similar to de facto 
parenthood as it is understood by most states, a parent by estoppel under the ALI Principles 
stands in legal parity with a legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.143 
 In contrast, the ALI Principles defines de facto parent, in part, as someone, other than a 
legal parent or a parent by estoppel, who has lived with the child for at least two years; and “for 
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of the legal parent 
to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal 
parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking 
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functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of the caretaking functions at least as 
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.”144 Under the ALI Principles 
definition, a de facto parent may not be awarded a majority of custodial responsibility for the 
child if a legal parent or parent by estoppel is fit and willing to care for the child.145  
 There are confusing differences in the definitions of these doctrines, but the main 
components of all these equitable theories are the same under the ALI Principles as under the 
common state court definitions discussed above.  There are, however, differences in terms of the 
legal consequences attached to the theory by which an individual is determined to be a parent. In 
sum, under the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is someone who has entered into an 
agreement with the legal parent to assume full, permanent, and co-equal parental responsibility 
for a child and who has the same rights and responsibilities as a legal parent. A de facto parent is 
someone who develops a parent-like relationship with a child as a result of stepping in to 
perform caretaking functions; therefore, de facto parentage is a lesser status, and provides fewer 
rights, than legal parentage or parentage by estoppel. 
 Unlike Debra H.’s reliance on Alison D., which requires same-sex couples in New York 
to have a formalized second-parent adoption, equitable remedies such as those discussed in this 
Part are designed to protect children’s important relationships with parents who are not in a legal 
same-sex relationship that bestows automatic parental rights and obligations and either cannot or 
do not take steps to formalize their parent-child bonds through adoption. New York is out of step 
with most courts which reject a Debra H.-type parentage standard, holding instead that a person's 
inability or failure to adopt is not a bar to establishing parentage.146 For example, the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that: “[t]he ability to marry the biological parent and the 
ability to adopt the subject child have never been and are not now factors in determining whether 
the third party assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties.”147 Similarly, the 
Vermont Supreme Court has rejected the view that couples who use assisted reproduction should 
be required to adopt in order to gain parental status, recognizing “[t]he disruption that would be 
caused by requiring adoption of all children conceived by artificial insemination.” 148 The ALI 
Principles also expressly states that “[n]either the unavailability of adoption nor the failure to 
adopt when adoption would have been available forecloses parent-by-estoppel status.”149  
V.   CONCLUSION 
  
 Looking at Debra H. and H.M. together, one can clearly see an alarming development: 
eliminated the applicability of equitable principles to provide legal parental status for a non-
biological, non-adoptive parent to contest custody/visitation, while at the same time relying on 
such principles to force child support payments on the same individuals. Child visitation 
jurisprudence and child support jurisprudence should stand in parity, making it so an individual 
would simply be adjudicated a parent, not a parent solely for contesting child custody/visitation 
or a parent solely for child support. Otherwise, not only is the best interest of the child lost, but 
so too is the principle of fundamental fairness on the part of the defendant partner. 
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